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Abstract
Blockchain technology has gained prominence over the last decade. Numerous achievements have been made regarding
how this technology can be utilized in different aspects of the industry, market, and governmental departments. Due to
the safety-critical and security-critical nature of their uses, it is pivotal to model the dependability of blockchain-based
systems. In this study, we focus on Bitcoin, a blockchain-based peer-to-peer cryptocurrency system. A continuous-time
Markov chain-based analytical method is put forward to model and quantify the dependability of the Bitcoin system
under selfish mining attacks. Numerical results are provided to examine the influences of several key parameters related
to selfish miners’ computing power, attack triggering, and honest miners’ recovery capability. The conclusion made
based on this research may contribute to the design of resilience algorithms to enhance the self-defense and robustness
of cryptocurrency systems.
Keywords- Bitcoin, Blockchain, Selfish mining, Continuous-time Markov chain, Dependability.

1. Introduction
Intensive research and development efforts from academia, industries and governments have been
devoted to blockchain technology in the last decade (Ferrag et al., 2018; Kang et al., 2018; Dai et
al., 2019; Bhushan et al., 2021). It has been applied to diverse applications, such as smart contracts,
financial services, voting, supply chains, Internet of Things, energy trading, etc. (Akbari et al.,
2017; Frizzo-Barker et al., 2020; Wongthongtham et al., 2021; Xing, 2020, 2021). Due to the
safety-critical and security-critical nature of these applications, it is crucial to model the
dependability attribute of the blockchain-based systems. In this work, we focus on the dependability
modeling and analysis of Bitcoin, a blockchain-based peer-to-peer cryptocurrency network
(Nakamoto, 2008).
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In contrast to the traditional fiat currency, Bitcoin is a decentralized system where individuals can
freely trade without engaging banks (Tschorsch and Scheuermann, 2016). Bitcoin is now widely
utilized in diverse fields with a market cap of over $1trillion (Best, 2021). Due to its businesscritical nature, the Bitcoin network has become the target of many cyber-attacks. For instance, a
malicious attacker may compromise the blockchain data availability by generating illegal or
incorrect access to the data through tracking correspondences of different addresses like the Bitcoin
and IP addresses (Koshy et al., 2014). An attacker may also temper the data by attacking the
blockchain’s consensus mechanism (Bag et al., 2016). Through tracking relationships between
addresses of transactions in the Bitcoin open network, an attacker may access users’ personal
information (Reid and Harrigan, 2013). Other examples of security attacks launched to the Bitcoin
system include but are not limited to selfish mining attacks (Eyal and Sirer, 2014), sybil attacks
(Zhang and Lee, 2019), mining pool attacks (Bahack, 2013; Qin et al., 2020), miner attacks
(Rosenfeld, 2011), re-identification attacks (Meiklejohn et al., 2013), eclipse attacks (Zhou et al.,
2021a), and CryptoLocker-based attacks (Liao et al., 2016).
Many research efforts have been dedicated to defending the Bitcoin system against those security
attacks. For instance, a mitigation approach based on modifying the Bitcoin protocol was proposed
in Eyal and Sirer (2014) to defend Bitcoin against colluding selfish mining attacks. Several
countermeasures (updating block advertisements, dynamic timeouts, penalizing non-responding
nodes) were investigated in Gervais et al. (2015) to improve the Bitcoin network security. A
hardware token was suggested in Bamert et al. (2014) to secure Bitcoin transactions. The weakness
of Bitcoin in protecting privacy was first studied and an anonymous, decentralized payment
mechanism was then suggested for privacy protection in Monaco (2015). The threat to Bitcoin from
the pool mining was first discussed and Markov chains were then applied for stochastic analysis of
a two-phase proof-of-work in Bastiaan (2015). Markov chains were utilized in Göbel et al. (2016)
for possibly detecting block-hiding attacks through monitoring orphan blocks’ production rate.
While existing works have mostly centered on studying impacts of the malicious behaviors or
detecting and defending threats, some of the recent efforts have been expended in the quantitative
performance evaluation of Bitcoin. For example, in Wang et al. (2020), a mathematical model was
proposed to estimate the performance and effectiveness of selfish attacks quantitatively and
investigated the relationship between the extra mining gain and computational power. In Motlagh
et al. (2021), an analytical model was proposed for studying the effects of selfish mining on the
Bitcoin network connectivity, node response time, block delivery time, and block arrival rate. In
Zhou et al. (2021a), a continuous-time Markov Chain-based approach was suggested for assessing
the dependability of a Bitcoin node subject to Eclipse attacks; this work was extended in Zhou et
al. (2021b) through semi-Markov models for accommodating non-exponential state transition time
distributions. In Yang et al. (2020), a Markov model was applied to evaluate the mining revenue,
and potential risk of the Bitcoin system under selfish mining. In Xia et al. (2021), the impacts of
multiple miners and propagation delay on selfish mining were studied, which found that the Bitcoin
network with a higher orphan rate is more vulnerable. To the best of our knowledge, no works have
been done to study the selfish mining behavior from the perspective of the Bitcoin network
dependability and identify the attacking or defending parameters as well as their effects on the
Bitcoin network dependability attribute.
In this paper, we advance the state of the art by examining the selfish mining behavior and
considering this attack behavior in the quantitative dependability analysis of the Bitcoin network.
We also investigate the impacts of several key parameters related to selfish miners’ computing
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power, attack triggering and honest miners’ recovery capability on the Bitcoin dependability
through numerical results.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the functioning mechanism of the
selfish mining attack. Section 3 presents the state transition diagram of the Bitcoin system under
the selfish mining attack. Section 4 derives the state probabilities and the Bitcoin dependability
using the continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC)-based approach. Section 5 carries out a
numerical analysis of several key model parameters and discusses their impacts on the Bitcoin
dependability. Section 6 concludes our study results and discusses future research plans.

2. The Selfish Mining Attack
In the selfish mining attack (also known as the block withholding attack), selfish miners
intentionally withhold the newly mined blocks. Instead of broadcasting the new blocks
immediately, the selfish miners keep these blocks secretly and build their own branches. At a
certain point, the selfish miners publish their private branch and gain unfair revenue.
In this research, we focus on the three-block strategy. Due to the limitation of computing power, it
is often extremely hard to expand the lead. To realize the attack, an attacker always withholds the
mined blocks and keeps mining on the private branch until the private branch is exactly three blocks
longer than the main branch. When the honest miner finds the next block, the attacker publishes
their private branch immediately. Because of the proof-of-work protocol, the attacker can
successfully claim the rewards while the honest miner’s computing power is wasted. Figure 1
shows the flowchart of a successful selfish mining attack.

No

0: Main chain

with no branch

l : Private branch
is one block
longer

4: Attacker publishes
priv ate branch
(Attack Success )

Figure 1. Flowchart of a successful selfish mining attack.
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The realization of the selfish mining attack highly depends on the computing power. Some
blockchain attacks like Eclipse attacks are capable of controlling the blockchain channels and
information flows of more nearby nodes, and gradually controlling most of the blockchain network.
Thus, a successful Eclipse attack can reinforce the selfish mining attack (Heilman et al., 2015).

3. State-Transition Diagram
Based on the working mechanism of the selfish attack presented in Section 2, we illustrate the state
transition diagram of the Bitcoin system under the attack in Figure 2. Six major states are
differentiated and defined: 0 (original or initial state), 0’ (double branches), 1 (one block lead), 2
(two-block lead), 3 (three-block lead), and 4 (attack success).
µ oo
Al2

µo'o

A23

2
µ 21

3

A 34

·•

Figure 2. State transition diagram of the bitcoin under the selfish mining attack.

In the original state 0, there is only one main chain every miner is mining on. There is no branch.
Under state 0, the malicious miner mines a block and keeps it secretly. As a result, a private branch
is built and the system transits from state 0 to state 1 with transition rate of λ01. Under state 0, if the
honest miner finds the block first, then the system remains in state 0 with µ00.
Under state 1, if the malicious miner successfully finds the next block on their private branch, then
the system transits to state 2 with transition rate of λ12. Under state 1, if the honest miner finds the
next block before the malicious miner, then the system transits to state 0’ with transition rate of
µ10’.
Under state 0’ (the chain has two branches of length one), if the malicious miner finds the new
block with rate λ0’1, the system transits to state 1 where the selfish miner’s private branch is one
block longer. If the honest miner finds the new block first, the system can transit back to the initial
state 0 with rate µ0’0 .
Under state 2, the malicious miner can be the first one to find the next block with rate λ23, causing
the system to transit to state 3. Under state 2, if the honest miner discovers the next block, the
system can transit back to state 1 with rate µ21.
Under state 3, when the honest miner successfully finds the next block with rate λ34, the system
transits to state 4. Under state 4, the selfish miner broadcasts their private branch, which becomes
the main branch. Consequently, the selfish mining attack completes.
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Based on the state transition diagram, Section 4 derives the state probabilities and further the
Bitcoin dependability based on the continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) approach. Section 5
investigates the effects of some representative state transition rates on the Bitcoin dependability.

4. CTMC-based Dependability Evaluation
Based on the state transition diagram of Figure 2, we present the state equations in Eq. (1), which
consists of a transition rate matrix, a state probability vector, and a vector of the derivative of the
state probability. Particularly, 𝑃𝑗 (𝑡) denotes the probability that the Bitcoin is in state j (j = 0, 0’, 1,
2, 3, 4), and 𝑃𝑗̇ (𝑡) denotes the derivative of the state j probability.
𝑃0̇ (𝑡)
𝑃0 (𝑡)
−𝜆01
𝜇0′ 0
0
0
0
0
𝑃̇0′ (𝑡)
𝑃0′ (𝑡)
0
−(𝜇0′ 0 + 𝜆0′ 1 )
𝜇10′
0
0
0
𝜇21
0
𝑃1 (𝑡)
𝑃1̇ (𝑡)
0
𝜆 0′ 1
−(𝜇10′ + 𝜆12 )
𝜆01
=
(1)
0
)
−(𝜇21 + 𝜆23
0
𝑃2 (𝑡)
𝑃2̇ (𝑡)
0
0
𝜆12
−𝜆34 0
𝜆23
𝑃3 (𝑡)
0
0
0
𝑃3̇ (𝑡)
𝜆
0
0
34
[ 0
] [ 𝑃4 (𝑡) ]
0
0
[ 𝑃4̇ (𝑡) ]
Eqs. (2)-(7) are separate differential equations based on Eq. (1).
𝑃0̇ (𝑡) = −𝜆01 𝑃0 (𝑡) + 𝜇0′ 0 𝑃0′ (𝑡),

()

𝑃̇0′ (𝑡) = 𝜇10′ 𝑃1 (𝑡) − (𝜇0′ 0 + 𝜆0′ 1 )𝑃0′ (𝑡)

()

𝑃1̇ (𝑡) = 𝜆01 𝑃0 (𝑡) + 𝜆0′ 1 𝑃0′ (𝑡) − (𝜇10′ + 𝜆12 )𝑃1 (𝑡) + 𝜇21 𝑃2 (𝑡),

()

𝑃2̇ (𝑡) = 𝜆12 𝑃1 (𝑡) − (𝜇21 + 𝜆23 )𝑃2 (𝑡),

()

𝑃3̇ (𝑡) = 𝜆23 𝑃2 (𝑡) − 𝜆34 𝑃3 (𝑡)

()

𝑃4̇ (𝑡) = 𝜆34 𝑃3 (𝑡)

()

Applying the Laplace transform-based method, we solve Eqs. (2)-(7) to obtain the system state
probabilities (Xing et al., 2019). The initial state probabilities used are 𝑃0 (0) = 1 and
∑4𝑖=0,0′ 𝑃𝑖 (𝑡) = 1. Specifically, the Laplace transforms of the six Bitcoin system state probabilities
𝑃𝑖∗ (𝑠) (j = 0, 0’, 1, 2, 3, 4), are
1
1
µ0’0
A
𝜆 ∗A
𝜆23 ∗𝜆12 ∗A
𝜆 ∗𝜆12 ∗𝜆34 ∗A
∗ (𝑠)
𝑃0′
= (− -)/(1 + + + 01 ++ 23 ),
(8)
)
)∗𝑠
𝑠

𝑠+𝜆01

s+𝜆01

µ10’

µ10’ ∗B

µ10’ ∗B∗(s+𝜆34

µ10’ ∗B∗(s+𝜆34

𝑃0∗ (𝑠) =

∗ (𝑠)+1
µ0’0 ∗𝑃0′
,
𝑠+𝜆01

𝑃1∗ (𝑠) =

∗ (𝑠)
𝐴∗𝑃0′
,
µ10’

(10)

𝑃2∗ (𝑠) =

∗ (𝑠)
𝜆12 ∗A∗𝑃0′
,
µ10’ ∗B

(11)

𝑃3∗ (𝑠) =

∗ (𝑠)
𝜆23 ∗𝜆12 ∗A∗𝑃0′
,
µ10’ ∗B∗(s+𝜆34 )

(12)

𝑃4∗ (𝑠) =

∗ (𝑠)
𝜆23 ∗𝜆12 ∗𝜆34 ∗A∗𝑃0′
,
µ10’ ∗B∗(s+𝜆34 )∗s

(13)

(9)
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where, A = s + µ0’0 + λ0’1, and B = s + µ21 + λ23.
Applying the inverse Laplace transform to 𝑃𝑖∗ (𝑠) in Eqs. (8)-(13) (conducted by MATLAB in our
work), we obtain the Bitcoin system state probabilities Pj(t) (j = 0, 0’, 1, 2, 3, 4) in the time domain.
Further, the Bitcoin dependability (the probability that the Bitcoin system performs correctly) is
̅ (𝑡) = P4(t) (the Bitcoin is not
evaluated as D(t) = P0(t) + P0’(t) + P1(t) + P2(t) + P3(t). Thus, 𝐷
dependable since the selfish mining attack is successful under state 4).

5. Numerical Results and Impacts of Model Parameters
In this section, the effects of several key parameters on the Bitcoin dependability are investigated
through numerical results. These results could help us gain a better understanding of the selfish
mining mechanism.
Based on statistics and survey from Sapirshtein et al. (2016), seven sets of parameter values are
designed in Table 1 for the transition rates in Figure 2, including rates related to the selfish miner’s
attacking behavior or power (λ01 , λ0’1 , λ12 , λ23 , λ34), and rates related to the honest miner’s recovery
capability (𝜇0′0 , 𝜇10′ , and 𝜇21 ).
In particular, we study the impacts of parameters λ01 , λ12 , λ34, 𝜇10′ , and 𝜇21 on the Bitcoin
dependability using parameter sets of Table 1. Specifically, (λ01 , λ12) reflect the selfish miner’s
computing power; their impacts are studied via parameter sets a, b, and c in Table 1. λ34 models the
Bitcoin system’s trigger rate; its impacts are examined via parameter sets d, b and e. (𝜇10′ , 𝜇21 )
reflect the honest miner’s recovery capability; their impacts are examined using sets f, b, and g in
Table 1.

Table 1. State transition rate (per hour) values used for numerical analysis.
Rate
𝜆01
𝜆0′1
𝜆12
𝜆23
𝜆34
𝜇0′0
𝜇10′
𝜇21

Set a
0.03
0.11
0.06
0.04
0.36
0.24
0.12
0.31

Set b
0.12
0.11
0.18
0.04
0.36
0.24
0.12
0.31

Set c
0.34
0.11
0.56
0.04
0.36
0.24
0.12
0.31

Set d
0.12
0.11
0.18
0.04
0.14
0.24
0.12
0.31

Set e
0.12
0.11
0.18
0.04
0.58
0.24
0.12
0.31

Set f
0.12
0.11
0.18
0.04
0.36
0.24
0.06
0.15

Set g
0.12
0.11
0.18
0.04
0.36
0.24
0.24
0.48

5.1 Impacts of Selfish Miner’s Computing Power Parameters 𝝀𝟎𝟏 , 𝝀𝟏𝟐

The impacts of the selfish attacker’s computing power are examined via parameter sets a, b, and c
in Table 1, which model the selfish miner who has relatively low, medium, and high computing
power, respectively. These malicious miners sometimes incorporate other attack methods like
Eclipse attacks to reinforce their computing power dramatically. Table 2 presents the Bitcoin
dependability under sets a, b, and c for several values of mission time. Figure 3 demonstrates the
dependability results graphically.
It can be observed from Figure 3 that the Bitcoin dependability decreases with time. The Bitcoin
system under set a (low computing power of the selfish miner) has the highest dependability D and
the lowest decreasing speed. The Bitcoin system under set c (high computing power of the selfish
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miner) has the lowest dependability D and decreases with the highest speed. The Bitcoin
dependability D under set b (average computing power of the selfish miner) has values between
the former two cases. The above results are intuitive since it is more difficulty for the Bitcoin
system to stay in the dependable state when the selfish attacker has a higher computing power. As
time proceeds, the difference in the Bitcoin dependability between the low and high computing
power cases becomes more significant due to the different declination speeds under these two cases.

Table 2. The bitcoin dependability under sets a, b, c.
t (hrs)
6
12
18
24
30
36

Set a
0.999486
0.996382
0.990735
0.983527
0.975478
0.967005

Set b
0.995046
0.970478
0.933354
0.892441
0.851532
0.811891

Set c
0.974593
0.888651
0.791052
0.700741
0.620233
0.548892

-· --c
a

11

b

---- b

c

0.9

0.8
0.8

0.6
0.7
0.6
0.4
0.5

0.2
0.4
0

0.3

0

0

6

6

12

12

18

18
T

24

24

30

30

36

36

Figure 3. Impacts of parameters 𝜆01 , 𝜆12 on the Bitcoin dependability.

5.2 Impacts of Trigger Parameter 𝝀𝟑𝟒
In Table 1, the impacts of the attack trigger parameter 𝜆34 are examined via parameter sets d, b,
and e with low, medium, and high trigger rates, respectively. Table 3 presents the Bitcoin
dependability results computed using those three parameter sets. Figure 4 demonstrates the Bitcoin
dependability results graphically.

Table 3. The bitcoin dependability under sets d, b, and e.
t (hrs)
6
12
18
24
30
36

Set d
0.997539
0.982237
0.953978
0.918293
0.879581
0.840341

Set b
0.995046
0.970478
0.933354
0.892442
0.851531
0.811892

22 | Vol. 7, No. 1, 2022

Set e
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0.965505
0.926607
0.885231
0.844381
0.804993
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d

b

e

1
0.95
0.9
0.85
0.8
0.75
0

6

12

18

24

30

36

t

Figure 4. Impacts of parameters 𝜆34 on the Bitcoin dependability.

It can be observed from Figure 4 that the Bitcoin system under set d (low trigger rate) has the
highest dependability D and the lowest decreasing speed as time proceeds; the Bitcoin under set e
(high trigger rate) has the lowest dependability D and the highest decreasing speed as time proceeds;
the values of D under set b (medium trigger rate) are between the former two cases. These numerical
results are intuitive since the higher trigger rate means it is more likely to realize the last attack step,
which eventually leads to the successful selfish mining attack, and hence lower the system
dependability. As time proceeds, the difference in the Bitcoin dependability between the low and
high trigger rate cases becomes more noticeable at the beginning and then tends to become stable
for the considered parameter settings.

5.3 Impacts of Recovery Capability Parameters 𝝁𝟏𝟎′ , 𝝁𝟐𝟏
The impacts of the recovery capability parameters 𝜇10′ , 𝜇21 on the Bitcoin dependability are
examined via parameter sets f, b, and g in Table 1, where an honest miner has low, average/medium,
and high recovery capability, respectively. Table 4 presents the Bitcoin system dependability
results under sets f, b and g. Figure 5 demonstrates the results graphically.

Table 4. The Bitcoin dependability under sets f, b, and g.
t (hrs)
6
12
18
24
30
36

Set f
0.993886
0.958601
0.899313
0.830612
0.761233
0.695032

Set b
0.995046
0.970478
0.933354
0.892441
0.851531
0.811892

23 | Vol. 7, No. 1, 2022

Set g
0.996187
0.980332
0.959003
0.936624
0.914432
0.892744
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Figure 5. Effects of parameters 𝜇10′ , 𝜇21 on the Bitcoin dependability.

It can be observed from Figure 5 that the Bitcoin system under set f (honest miner with low
recovery capability) has the lowest system dependability D and the highest decreasing speed as
time proceeds; the Bitcoin under set g (honest miner with high recovery capability) has the highest
values of D and the lowest decreasing speed among the three cases; the Bitcoin under set b (honest
miner with average recovery capability) has values of D between the former two cases. From the
above intuitive results, we can conclude that the Bitcoin system with honest miners having higher
recovery capability is more dependable. Moreover, as time proceeds, the difference in the Bitcoin
dependability between the low and high recovery capability cases becomes more notable due to
the different declination speeds under these two cases.

6. Conclusion and Future Directions
The Bitcoin network is vulnerable to selfish mining attacks, during which a malicious miner
withholds the mined block and mines on its own private chain secretly. The existing studies on
selfish mining have mostly focused on cryptography and protocol designs, risk detection and
damage estimation caused by the adversaries. To defend against selfish mining, it is crucial to study
the behavior of selfish mining from the Bitcoin network dependability’s perspective. This paper
makes contributions to the state of the art by building an analytical dependability model based on
the CTMC for the Bitcoin system subject to the selfish mining attack. Numerical results are
provided to assess the impacts of several model factors (including selfish miners’ computing power,
the attack triggering parameter, and honest miners’ recovery capability) on the overall Bitcoin
dependability. The findings include 1) it is more unlikely that the Bitcoin system stays in the
dependable state when the selfish attacker has a higher computing power; 2) the Bitcoin system
tends to fail more quickly as the trigger rate increases; and 3) the Bitcoin system tends to be more
dependable when its honest miners have better recovery capability.
While the findings from this research are mostly intuitive, the quantitative results and comparisons
will provide effective guidance for us to develop resilience algorithms and protocols. Such
algorithms can enhance the robustness of the current blockchain-based cryptocurrency network
models, improving their self-defense capability against various malicious attacks. In the future
24 | Vol. 7, No. 1, 2022
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study, we are also interested in extending our dependability analysis to non-exponential state
transition times through exploring methods such as semi-Markov models (Zhou et al., 2021b) and
multi-integral-based analytical methods (Zeng et al., 2019).
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